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International Institute of Air and Space Law, 
Leiden - The Netherlands 
F.G.vonderDunk@law.leidenuniv.nl 
1. Introduction 
The Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space, usually goin~ 
by the name of 'Registration Convention' , 
was the fourth treaty exclusively dedicated 
to outer space which was developed in the 
bosom of the United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, after 
the 1967 Outer S~ace Treaty,2 the 1968 
Rescue Agreement and the 1972 Liability 
Convention.4 Only the 1979 Moon 
Agreement5 was still to follow, which for 
general lack of success however heralded 
the end of a two-decade time-span in 
which COPUOS managed to develop the 
framework for international space law as 
far as binding legal instruments were 
concerned. 
The text of the Registration Convention 
was, after some years of discussion and 
drafting, adopted in New York on 12 
November 1974, and made public through a 
Resolution of the General Assembly -
Resolution 3235(XXIX), which contained 
the text in the Annex and opened the 
Convention for signature as per 14 January 
1975. It entered into force quite rapidly on 
15 September 1976, after the fifth 
instrument of deposit had been received 
with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 6 
2. The Registration Convention in the 
context of the other UN treaties on space 
When evaluating the Registration 
Convention in the larger context of the 
corpus juris spatialis internationalis (in 
particular the other four treaties mentioned) 
and its development over time, the 
following further picture emerges. 
Compared to its three elder counterparts, 
the Registration Convention did not draw 
overly widespread ratification: only 44 
states are parties to the Convention, with a 
further 4 states having signed but not (yet) 
ratified. 7 On the other hand, the 
Registration Convention distinguishes itself 
positively from the Moon Agreement not 
just by numbers but also by the importance 
of the states involved: in contrast to the 
latter treaty, most of the important space 
powers are party to the Registration 
Convention. 
This 'middle position' is probably 
symptomatic for the Convention: a 
relatively simple and down-to-earth treaty 
consisting of just 12 Articles elaborating 
one rather straightforward concept: the 
registration of space objects. Whilst it 
would, on the one hand, from that 
perspective seem to provide few 
disincentives for states to ratify, ratification 
on the other hand would be directly relevant 
especially for those states actually 
launching space objects into outer space -
which still constitute a minority amongst 
the states of this world. 
From a slightly different perspective, the 
Registration Convention is closest to the 
Rescue Agreement and the Liability 
Convention, in that each of these are 
essentially elaborating one specific Article 
of the Outer Space Treaty which, as the 
framework treaty, provides for the 
fundamental principles.8 For the Rescue 
Agreement this concerns Article V on 
astronauts as envoys of mankind, for the 
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Liability Convention Article VII on liability 
for damage caused by space activities, read 
space objects, whereas the Registration 
Convention elaborates Article VIII of the 
Outer Space Treaty which already posits 
both the concept of registration of space 
objects, and its major consequence, the 
possibility to exercise jurisdiction over the 
space objects so registered. 
This very elementary similarity in approach 
and background also caused a considerable 
number of states, in considering their 
possible adherence to the space treaties, to 
treat these three as rather closely inter-
related, and to ratify them together. In 
particular the Rescue Agreement and the 
Liability Convention were seen as almost 
constituting a package deal, balancing the 
interests of the space-faring nations in 
benign treatment of their astronauts and 
spacecraft with the interests of the non-
space-faring nativns in generous 
possibilities to see any damage caused by 
space activities compensated. The 
Registration Convention underpins this 
trade-off, as one major aim of the treaty is 
to enhance the chances of liable states being 
identified so that claims can actually be 
asserted. 
3. The substance of the Registration 
Convention 
Thus, upon second view, the relatively 
meagre ratification of the Registration 
Convention as compared to the other two 
probably indeed stems from the rather 
straightforward character of its subject-
matter. Let me playa bit the role of the 
devil's advocate here: the benefits to the 
international community of ratification by 
the (still) select group of independently 
space-faring nations9 are evident, but since 
the Convention only deals with the major 
parameters of the concept of registration 
and its major legal consequences, with one 
exception it does not contain any distinct 
rights or obligations for non-independently 
space-faring nations which would make it 
beneficial for those states to ratify 
themselves. 10 
The main rights such states could derive 
from ratification of the Registration 
Convention, as compared to simply being 
aware of its existence and the benefits if 
may offer in terms of identifying space 
objects having caused damage through a 
register accessible to everyone, amount to 
generic and rather basic ones. Only states 
party to the Convention are entitled to 
formally protest and bring forward legal 
claims in case another party to the 
Convention would fail to comply with its 
duties under it, since under general public 
international law only states parties to a 
treaty may consider their rights to be 
violated if another party does not fulfil the 
relevant obligations. 
This is where the devil' s advocate comes 
in. In the absence of substantive rights for 
non-registering states - with the one 
exception alluded to - this does not 
perhaps amount to much. In view 
moreover of the many loopholes and 
escape clauses and phrases which the 
Convention is saddled with (not to mention 
a general lack of sanctions and sanctioning 
mechanisms), as well as the fact that the 
UN Secretary General is supposed anyhow 
to represent the interests of such non-
independently space-faring nations in 
adherence of the independently space-
faring nations to the rules of the 
Convention, this perhaps provides a rather 
meagre incentive for such states to ratify. 
The exception arises in Article VI of the 
Registration Convention, providing a state 
having become the victim of damage 
resulting from space activities with the right 
to be assisted by those states with relevant 
monitoring and tracking facilities for the 
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purpose of trying to identify the launching 
state(s) of the space object at issue. This 
clause however, whilst most directly linking 
the Registration Convention to the Liability 
Convention as an effort to enhance the 
chances of identifying the liable state( s) and 
thus of considerable potential benefit to 
non-independently space-faring nations, 
upon closer view might not offer too much 
incentives for ratifying either. 
On the one hand, it only provides for an 
obligation of effort (the duty to respond on 
the part of the state with monitoring and 
tracking facilities is qualified as "to the 
greatest extent feasible"), on the other hand 
it still requires "agreement between the 
parties concerned" - which anyway can 
also be arranged without referring to the 
Convention or being a party to it. 
In other words: wrongly or rightly, non-
independently space-faring nations might 
have considered (and might still do so) their 
interests in the Convention to be sufficiently 
served by comprehensive ratification on the 
part of the independently space-/aring 
nations, without the need arising for their 
own ratification. 
One should not be allowed to forego the 
benefits of Article VI of the Convention so 
easily, however; and this should probably 
be the main aim of reinforcing the 
Registration Convention. 
4. Concluding remarks 
So where does that leave us by way of 
introduction from a historical and 
background-perspective? Perhaps the 
Registration Convention should not be 
considered such an only-halfway 
successful treaty when it comes to its role 
and impact; in view of the partisanship of 
most relevant independently space-faring 
nations as well as the character of the 
substance of the treaty's rules, the mere 
number of ratifications does not provide us 
with the full picture. 
At the same time and for that very reason 
attention is, or should be, largely redirected 
to reinforcing the Registration Convention 
in terms of substance, rather than simply 
exhorting non-parties to ratify. The treaty 
should, put plainly, be made of (even) 
more interest to (especially) non-
independently space-faring states by 
indeed making it more effective - that also 
would be the best way to mount further 
political pressure upon those independently 
space-faring nations not yet having 
ratified. 
Tightening and expanding the parameters 
to be registered respectively to be made 
available to the UN Secretary-General; 
including parameters necessary as a 
consequence of practical read 
commercial - developments such as 
private ownership of satellites or leases-
on-orbit and sales-on-orbit; ascertaining 
that another new and specific development 
- the UNIDROIT Convention and Protocol 
- will not dilute or interfere with the 
impact of the Registration Convention: 
those would be the focal points for near-
term future legal development and 
codification. 
This is therefore, what the current 
symposium has set out to contribute to. 
Since practical sense and reason tell us not 
to try and reinvent the wheel allover 
again, finally, presentations on the above 
issues are backed up by some examples of 
relevant practice re registration of space 
objects. All this, in order to set the tone for 
further beneficial development of the 
Registration Convention and its impact and 
relevance in practical terms. 
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1. Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space (hereafter 
Registration Convention), New York, 
adopted 12 November 1974, opened for 
signature 14 January 1975, entered into 
force 15 September 1976; 14 ILM 43 
(1975); 28 UST 695; TIAS 8480; 1023 
UNTS 15. 
2. Treaty on Principles Governing the 
Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer 
Space Treaty), 
LondonIMoscowlW ashington, adopted 19 
December 1966, opened for signature 27 
January 1967, entered into force 10 October 
1967; 6 ILM 386 (1967); 18 UST 2410; 
TIAS 6347; 610 UNTS 205. 
3. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(hereafter Rescue Agreement), 
LondonIMoscowlWashington, adopted 19 
December 1967, opened for signature 22 
April 1968, entered into force 3 December 
1968; 19 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; 672 
UNTS 119. 
4. Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects 
(hereafter Liab~lity Convention), 
LondonIMoscowlW ashington, adopted 29 
November 1971, opened for signature 29 
March 1972, entered into force 1 September 
1972; 10 ILM 965 (1971); 24 UST 2389; 
TIAS 7762; 961 UNTS 187. 
5. Agreement Governing the Activities of 
States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement), New 
York, adopted 5 December 1979, opened 
for signature 18 December 1979, entered 
into force 11 July 1984; 18 ILM 1434 
(1979); 1363 UNTS 3. 
6 See Art. VIII(3), Registration 
Convention. 
7. As per 1 January 2003; see the web-site 
of the United Nations Office for Outer 
Space Affairs (UN OOSA), at 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/t 
reaties.html. For the Outer Space Treaty, 
the Rescue Agreement and the Liability 
Convention the corresponding figures are, 
respectively, 98/27, 88125, and 82/25; for 
the Moon Agreement by contrast 1015. In 
addition, it may be mentioned that one 
intergovernmental organisations has 
deposited a relevant declaration accepting 
rights and duties under the Rescue 
Agreement, two have done so with respect 
to the Liability Convention, and two have 
done so with respect to the Registration 
Convention. 
8. The Moon Agreement from this 
perspective represents an elaboration of 
roughly ail of the Outer Space Treaty's 
substance with respect to specific parts of 
outer space, i.e. the moon and other 
celestial bodies. 
9. The concept of 'independently space-
faring' nations is meant to contrast with 
the majority of states which as of now 
undertake space activities, if at all, only 
within an international framework 
represented by intergovernmental 
organisations such as ESA, EUMETSAT, 
Intersputnik, Interkosmos and Arabsat, or 
under other, looser bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements. 
10. This is in stark contrast with the 
Liability Convention, where partisanship is 
required for becoming a claimant under it 
(Art. VIII) and for enjoying all the rights 
of claimants (Artt. IX-XIII) up to and 
including the right to establish a Claims 
Commission (Artt. XIV-XX). 
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